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Long but Great SR 71 True Story......Part 1

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Subject: Mach 3. 18 In-Flight Breakup Of An SR-71 Blackbird

Date: Sunday, December 24, 2006 6:50 AM



Mach 3. 18 In-Flight Breakup Of An SR-71 Blackbird



by Bill Weaver, Chief Test Pilot, Lockheed



Among professional aviators, there's a well-worn saying: Flying is

simply hours of boredom punctuated by moments of stark terror. But I

don't recall too many periods of boredom during my 30-year career with

Lockheed, most of which was spent as a test pilot. By far, the most

memorable flight occurred on Jan. 25, 1966.



Jim Zwayer, a Lockheed flight-test specialist, and I were evaluating

systems on an SR-71 Blackbird test from Edwards. We also were

investigating procedures designed to reduce trim drag and improve

high-Mach cruise performance The latter involved flying with the

center-of-gravity (CG) located further aft than normal, reducing the

Blackbird's longitudinal stability.



We took off from Edwards at 11:20 a. m. and completed the mission's first

leg without incident. After refueling from a KC-135 tanker, we turned

eastbound, accelerated to a Mach 3. 2 cruise speed and climbed to 78,000

ft. , our initial cruise-climb altitude.



Several minutes into cruise, the right engine inlet's automatic control

system malfunctioned, requiring a switch to manual control. The SR-71's

inlet configuration was automatically adjusted during supersonic flight

to decelerate airflow in the duct, slowing it to subsonic speed before

reaching the engine's face. This was accomplished by the inlet's

center-body spike translating aft, and by modulating the inlet's forward

bypass doors.



Normally, these actions were scheduled automatically as a function of

Mach number, positioning the normal shock wave (where air flow becomes

subsonic) inside the inlet to ensure optimum engine performance. Without

proper scheduling, disturbances inside the inlet could result in the

shock wave being expelled forward- a phenomenon known as an "inlet unstart. "



That causes an instantaneous loss of engine thrust, explosive banging

noises and violent yawing of the aircraft, like being in a train wreck.

Unstarts were not uncommon at that time in the SR-71's development, but

a properly functioning system would recapture the shock wave and restore

normal operation.



On the planned test profile, we entered a programmed 35-deg. bank turn

to the right. An immediate unstart occurred on the right engine, forcing

the aircraft to roll further right and start to pitch up. I jammed the

control stick as far left and forward as it would go. No response. I

instantly knew we were in for a wild ride. I attempted to tell Jim what

was happening and to stay with the airplane until we reached a lower

speed and altitude. I didn't think the chances of surviving an ejection

at Mach 3. 18 and 78,800 ft. were very good. However, g-forces built up

so rapidly that my words came out garbled and unintelligible, as

confirmed later by the cockpit voice recorder.



The cumulative effects of system malfunctions, reduced longitudinal

stability, increased angle-of-attack in the turn, supersonic speed, high

altitude and other factors imposed forces on the airframe that exceeded

flight control authority and the stability augmentation system's ability

to restore control.



Everything seemed to unfold in slow motion. I learned later the time

from event onset to catastrophic departure from controlled flight was

only 2-3 seconds. Still trying to communicate with Jim, I blacked out,

succumbing to extremely high g-forces.



Then the SR-71 literally disintegrated around us. From that point, I was

just along for the ride. And my next recollection was a hazy thought

that I was having a bad dream. Maybe I'll wake up and get out of this

mess, I mused. Gradually regaining consciousness, I realized this was no

dream; it had really happened. That also was disturbing, because I COULD

NOT HAVE SURVIVED what had just happened.



I must be dead. Since I didn't feel bad- just a detached sense of

euphoria- I decided being dead wasn't so bad after all. As full

awareness took hold, I realized I was not dead. But somehow I had

separated from the airplane.



I had no idea how this could have happened; I hadn't initiated an

ejection. The sound of rushing air and what sounded like straps flapping

in the wind confirmed I was falling, but I couldn't see anything. My

pressure suit's face plate had frozen over and I was staring at a layer

of ice.



The pressure suit was inflated, so I knew an emergency oxygen cylinder

in the seat kit attached to my parachute harness was functioning. It not

only supplied breathing oxygen, but also pressurized the suit,

preventing my blood from boiling at extremely high altitudes. I didn't

appreciate it at the time, but the suit's pressurization had also

provided physical protection from intense buffeting and g-forces. That

inflated suit had become my own escape capsule



My next concern was about stability and tumbling. Air density at hi gh

altitude is insufficient to resist a body's tumbling motions, and

centrifugal forces high enough to cause physical injury could develop

quickly. For that reason, the SR-71's parachute system was designed to

automatically deploy a small-diameter stabilizing chute shortly after

ejection and seat separation. Since I had not intentionally activated

the ejection system--and assuming all automatic functions depended on a

proper ejection sequence--it occurred to me the stabilizing chute may

not have deployed.



However, I quickly determined I was falling vertically and not tumbling.

The little chute must h ave deployed and was doing its job. Next

concern: the main parachute, which was designed to open automatically at

15,000 ft. Again I had no assurance the automatic-opening function would

work.



I couldn't ascertain my altitude because I still couldn't see through

the iced-up faceplate. There was no way to know how long I had been

blacked-out or how far I had fallen. I felt for the manual-activation

D-ring on my chute harness, but with the suit inflated and my hands

numbed by cold, I couldn't locate it. I decided I'd better open the

faceplate, try to estimate my height above the ground, then locate that

"D" ring. Just as I reached for the faceplate, I felt the reassuring

sudden deceleration of main-chute deployment.



I raised the frozen faceplate and discovered its uplatch was broken.

Using one hand to hold that plate up, I saw I was descending through a

clear, winter sky with unlimited visibility. I was greatly relieved to

see Jim's parachute coming down about a quarter of a mile away. I didn't

think either of us could have survived the aircraft's breakup, so seeing

Jim had also escaped lifted my spirits incredibly.



I could also see burning wreckage on the ground a few miles from where

we would land. The terrain didn't look at all inviting--a desolate, high

plateau dotted with patches of snow and no signs of habitation.



I tried to rotate the parachute and look in other directions. But with

one hand devoted to keeping the face plate up and both hands numb from

high-altitude, subfreezing temperatures, I couldn't manipulate the

risers enough to turn. Before the breakup, we'd started a turn in the

New Mexico-Colorado-Oklahoma-Texas border region. The SR-71 had a

turning radius of about 100 miles at that speed and altitude, so I

wasn't even sure what state we were going to land in. But, because it

was about 3:00 p. m. , I was certain we would be spending the night out here.



At about 300 ft. above the ground, I yanked the seat kit's release

handle and made sure it was still tied to me by a long lanyard.

Releasing the heavy kit ensured I wouldn't land with it attached to my

derriere, which could break a leg or cause other injuries. I then tried

to recall what survival items were in that kit, as well as techniques I

had been taught in survival training.



Looking down, I was startled to see a fairly large animal- perhaps an

antelope- directly under me. Evidently, it was just as startled as I was

because it literally took off in a cloud of dust.



(continued)
 
Part II

My first-ever parachute landing was pretty smooth. I landed on fairly

soft ground, managing to avoid rocks, cacti and antelopes. My chute was

still billowing in the wind, though. I struggled to collapse it with one

hand, holding the still-frozen faceplate up with the other.



"Can I help you? " a voice said. Was I hearing things? I must be

hallucinating. Then I looked up and saw a guy walking toward me, wearing

a cowboy hat. A helicopter was idling a short distance behind him. If I

had been at Edwards and told the search-and-rescue unit that I was going

to bail out over the Rogers Dry Lake at a particular time of day, a crew

couldn't have gotten to me as fast as that cowboy-pilot had.



The gentleman was Albert Mitchell, Jr. , owner of a huge cattle ranch in

northeastern New Mexico. I had landed about 1. 5 mi. from his ranch

house--and from a hangar for his two-place Hughes helicopter. Amazed to

see him, I replied I was having a little trouble with my chute. He

walked over and collapsed the canopy, anchoring it with several rocks.

He had seen Jim and me floating down and had radioed the New Mexico

Highway Patrol, the Air Force and the nearest hospital.



Extracting myself from the parachute harness, I discovered the source of

those flapping-strap noises heard on the way down. My seat belt and

shoulder harness were still draped around me, attached and latched.



The lap belt had been shredded on each side of my hips, where the straps

had fed through knurled adjustment rollers. The shoulder harness had

shredded in a similar manner across my back. The ejection seat had never

left the airplane. I had been ripped out of it by the extreme forces,

with the seat belt and shoulder harness still fastened.



I also noted that one of the two lines that supplied oxygen to my

pressure suit had come loose, and the other was barely hanging on. If

that second line had become detach ed at high altitude, the deflated

pressure suit wouldn't have provided any protection. I knew an oxygen

supply was critical for breathing and suit-pressurization, but didn't

appreciate how much physical protection an inflated pressure suit could

provide.



That the suit could withstand forces sufficient to disintegrate an

airplane and shred heavy nylon seat belts, yet leave me with only a few

bruises and minor whiplash was impressive. I truly appreciated having my

own little escape capsule.



After helping me with the chute, Mitchell said he'd check on Jim. He

climbed into his helicopter, flew a short distance away and returned

about 10 minutes later with devastating news: Jim was dead. Apparently,

he had suffered a broken neck during the aircraft's disintegration and

was killed instantly.



Mitchell said his ranch foreman would soon arrive to watch over Jim's

body until the authorities arrived. I asked to see Jim and, after

verifying there was nothing more that could be done, agreed to let

Mitchell fly me to the Tucumcari hospital, about 60 mi. to the south.



I have vivid memories of that helicopter flight, as well. I didn't know

much about rotorcraft, but I knew a lot about "red lines," and Mitchell

kept the airspeed at or above red line all the way. The little

helicopter vibrated and shook a lot more than I thought it should have.

I tried to reassure the cowboy-pilot I was feeling OK; there was no need

to rush. But since he'd notified the hospital staff that we were

inbound, he insisted we get there as soon as possible. I couldn't help

but think how ironic it would be to have survived one disaster only to

be done in by the helicopter that had come to my rescue.



However, we made it to the hospital safely--and quickly. Soon, I was

able to contact Lockheed's flight test office at Edwards. The test team

there had been notified initially about the loss of radio and radar

contact, then told the aircraft had been lost. They also knew what our

flight conditions had been at the time, and assumed no one could have

survived. I explained what had happened, describing in fairly accurate

detail the flight conditions prior to breakup.



The next day, our flight profile was duplicated on the SR-71 flight

simulator at Beale AFB, Calif. The outcome was identical. Steps were

immediately taken to prevent a recurrence of our accident. Testing at a

CG aft of normal limits was discontinued, and trim-drag issues were

subsequently resolved via aerodynamic means. The inlet control system

was continuously improved and, with subsequent development of the

Digital Automatic Flight and Inlet Control System, inlet unstarts became

rare.



Investigation of our accident revealed that the nose section of the

aircraft had broken off aft of the rear cockpit and crashed about 10 mi

from the main wreckage. Parts were scattered over an area approximately

15 miles long and 10 miles wide. Extremely high air loads and g-forces,

both positive and negative, had literally ripped Jim and me from the

airplane. Unbelievably good luck is the only explanation for my escaping

relatively unscathed from that disintegrating aircraft.



Two weeks after the accident, I was back in an SR-71, flying the first

sortie on a brand-new bird at Lockheed's Palmdale, Calif. , assembly and

test facility. It was my first flight since the accident, so a flight

test engineer in the back seat was probably a little apprehensive about

my state of mind and confidence.



As we roared down the runway and lifted off, I heard an anxious voice

over the intercom.



"Bill! Bill! Are you there?"



"Yeah, George. What's the matter?"



"Thank God! I thought you might have left. " The rear cockpit of the

SR-71 has no forward visibility--only a small window on each side--and

George couldn't see me. A big red light on the master-warning panel in

the rear cockpit had illuminated just as we rotated, stating: "Pilot

Ejected. " Fortunately, the cause was a misadjusted micro switch, not my

departure
 
He stated that inthe first paragraph. I was wondering as well, since I thought that they stopped flying my favorite bird.



AC
 
i use to have a great article on the blackbird and the trouble they had with the intake spikes during development, i do remember one thing cool, the guy said they could of redesigned the spikes for a good bit more speed but it wasn't needed for the designed mission, and i think there was a bit of fighting between the engineers over how to power the spikes, electric or hydraulic, which ever came first was replaced by the other and that fixed the unstart problems because the spikes weren't moving fast enough if i remember right
 
WDixon27 said:
power the spikes, electric or hydraulic, which ever came first was replaced by the other and that fixed the unstart problems





The later versions got computer controlled spikes that acted quicker than the old pilot controlled versions. I have a good book by Brian Shul called Sled Driver. Good read and some awesome pictures of and from the SR-71. I met Brian(and he signed my book) in 2001 at the Edwards Open House Air Show.
 
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