What is very disconcerting is that Chrysler is sitting on the recall information. http://www.autonews.com/article/201...-nhtsa-to-move-faster-on-takata-airbag-recall
A while back we received a recall notice for our Dodge minivan's ignition switch. It states the switch will be replaced but the parts are not available. It says what to do to minimize any risk with the current switch and that we will be notified when the parts become available. There is no reason they could not do such a recall with the airbags.
I do not like driving around playing Russian roulette with a hand grenade in the steering wheel. The fear the programmer that worked in the Mexican airbag plants had of defective ignitors makes me wonder what information he was privy to that made him so extremely concerned. As usual we are only getting part of the story from the manufacturers.
A while back we received a recall notice for our Dodge minivan's ignition switch. It states the switch will be replaced but the parts are not available. It says what to do to minimize any risk with the current switch and that we will be notified when the parts become available. There is no reason they could not do such a recall with the airbags.
I do not like driving around playing Russian roulette with a hand grenade in the steering wheel. The fear the programmer that worked in the Mexican airbag plants had of defective ignitors makes me wonder what information he was privy to that made him so extremely concerned. As usual we are only getting part of the story from the manufacturers.
http://blog.caranddriver.com/massive-takata-airbag-recall-everything-you-need-to-know-including-full-list-of-affected-vehicles/ said:The New York Times has published a report suggesting that Takata knew about the airbag issues in 2004, conducting secret tests off work hours to verify the problem. The results confirmed major issues with the inflators, and engineers quickly began researching a solution. But instead of notifying federal safety regulators and moving forward with fixes, Takata executives ordered its engineers to destroy the data and dispose of the physical evidence. This occurred a full four years before Takata publicly acknowledged the problem.